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Abstract 
Previous evidence on monetary policy finds positive value effects on REITs when federal fund rates are 
decreased in order to strengthen the market’s liquidity pool. Bank bailouts can also be seen as a positive 
monetary shock to capital markets as government intervention restores bank liquidity and thus market liquidity. 
However, empirical evidence on moral hazard shows that bailing out banks may increase risky behavior and 
benefit relatively risky assets. Therefore, we expect REITs as hard assets to underperform the market on a short 
term basis. In fact we find supporting evidence i.e. negative abnormal returns and beta risk increases for REITs 
around bank bailout announcements. This extends previous research on bank failures and REIT returns where 
positive abnormal REIT returns around bank failures identify REITs as a safe haven in times of market 
uncertainty. Furthermore we complete our research by investigating other financial stocks, finding unique 
results. 
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1 Introduction 
In the turbulent times of the financial crisis that started in 2007, the financial sector (first and 
foremost with banks as well as real estate) was commonly believed to have triggered the 
global crisis through the subprime mortgage problem. The banking crisis and the fear of a 
fatal breakdown of the economic system have caused the government to launch the largest 
bailout program in the history of the United States of America. The US government created 
the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to purchase failing bank assets. The 
major goals of this highly criticized program were economic stabilization, market liquidity 
improvement and investor confidence restoration (Paulson, 2008). 
Although REITs are commonly classified as financial stocks along with banks, many 
consider them to be an asset class of their own, due to their special characteristics and 
differences from common equities. REITs are highly dependent on external financing, which 
might on the one hand hinder their performance during times of market uncertainty, but on the 
other hand might drive their performance following a recapitalization and stabilization of the 
banking sector. 
There has been discussion on the moral hazard involved in government bailout 
programs, and the danger of encouraging excessive risk taking behavior. Looking at REITs, 
previous research has shown that REITs’ risk-return behavior appears to be a combination of 
real estate and common equity market behavior, which does not allow for a clear correlation 
to any other stock group. All in all, we are convinced that a detailed analysis of REITs’ risk-
return behavior compared with other financial stocks and relative to common equities in the 
event of bank bailouts represents worthwhile research effort and adds to the current literature. 
Regarding behavioral expectations of REITs’ risk-return movements around bank 
bailouts, we would expect a behavior similar to common equities but have found negative 
valuation effects. The recapitalization of the banking sector, resulting in restored liquidity of 
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the market should favor relatively risky investments such as equities (including REITs) 
compared to low risk investments such as government bonds and commodities, e.g., precious 
metals. Because REITs are strongly dependent on external financing they might have 
abnormal profits from restored market liquidity. This valuation effect on REITs constitutes 
our null hypothesis. 
The alternative hypothesis implies a relatively negative valuation effect for REITs. As 
investors commonly interpret REITs as a safe haven during financial crisis, REITs might 
underperform other equities in the aftermath of a market recapitalization. Moral hazard 
symptoms, encouraging risk taking, might favor assets that show less hard asset 
characteristics than REITs and appear to be more risky and hence more promising. 
Consequently, the alternative hypothesis assumes that REITs do not follow common equities 
behavior in the case of specific monetary shocks, such as bank bailouts, as they do in the case 
of monetary shocks through unexpected monetary rate changes. 
The effects of monetary shocks to the market have been researched extensively. 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) researched the impact of a change in monetary policy and found 
that unexpected decreases in the monetary rate let to an increase in stock prices. In their 
research Bredin, O’Reilly, and Stevenson (2007) focus on the effects these monetary rate 
adjustments might have on REITs. They also state that REITs, due to their special 
characteristics, are a good estimator for common equities’ behavior. Diamond and Rajan 
(2005) showed that, when banks fail, this can potentially be contagious and a consecutive 
shrinking of the market’s liquidity pool might trigger liquidity shortages, representing a 
monetary shock to the market. 
We investigate whether REITs show comparable results to common equities in the 
case of bank bailouts and if their behavior depends critically on the type of monetary shock to 
the market. Monetary rate increases and bank failures result in a limitation of the market’s 
liquidity pool. But they generally occur in completely opposing market situations. Monetary 
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rates are generally increased in times of positive economic and market prospects, whereas 
bank failures typically occur at the peak of, or in the aftermath of, an economic crisis. Our 
earlier research documents that REITs show a positive valuation effect in relation to the stock 
market in the case of bank failures and hence react differently, compared to the case of a 
monetary rate increase. We are curious to find out whether, in the case of subsequent bank 
bailouts, REITs show comparable behavior to other equities. This expectation is based on the 
fact that generally the market is in the same state when bank bail-outs occur or monetary rates 
are decreased. However, it is also a valid assumption to expect negative valuation effects, as 
bank bailouts represent the opposite outcome for banking crises compared to bank failures, 
which caused positive REIT valuation effects. 
We analyze the impact of bank bailouts on REITs as financial stock in the U.S. with 
respect to any shifts in prevalent risk-return profiles. Consistent with a previous study on bank 
failures the research period extends from January 1999 until July 2010 and covers US-REITs. 
In addition, a representative sample of other financial stocks is analyzed for robustness. 
Although the analyzed time period reaches back to 1999, the actual observations were made 
from January 2008 until July 2010, due to the fact that no bank bailouts occurred in the time 
period from January 1999 until January 2008. Within the observation period 700 banks where 
bailed out on 49 different dates. Eliminating dates that overlap with bank failure dates, seven 
bank bailout dates are left. In order to obtain a number of events that can allow for statistically 
significant results, the research is carried out on the single stock level instead of on index 
level. Hence, the analysis is conducted for 121 REITs and for 229 other financial stocks. 
Diverse sub-samples where set up in order to investigate whether different types of REITs or 
other financial stocks are affected in a different manner. 
For all events we analyze short window abnormal returns and abnormal risk shifts to 
verify whether bank bailouts have affected REITs’ risk-return profile differently than 
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common equity markets and other financial stocks, and whether we can observe different 
reactions compared to the findings on bank failures in previous research. 
The paper is structured as follows: In part 2 we review the literature; in part 3 we 
explain our data selection and the empirical methodology; in part 4 we present our results; in 
part 5 we conclude.              
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Market Liquidity, Bank Bailouts, and REIT Behavior 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) investigate the effect of changes in monetary policy as a 
monetary shock on equity prices and find that an unanticipated cut of the federal funds rate 
leads to an increase in stock prices. They furthermore find that the largest part of the response 
in stock prices is due to the revision of cash flows and only a very small portion is attributable 
to the changes in expected real interest rates. In their research Bredin, O’Reilly, and 
Stevenson (2007) focus on the effects that monetary rate changes may have on REIT returns 
and volatility. Their results are in line with previous evidence on broader equity markets and 
show, that REITs had a strong response to unanticipated changes in monetary policy in both, 
first and second moments of REIT returns. Their findings support the expected trend of the 
effect, hence a positive return and a negative volatility reaction for a cut in the monetary rate. 
The assumption, that banking crises can also be seen as a monetary shock is supported 
by the findings of Diamond and Rajan (2005). They state, that banking crises, especially those 
resulting in bank failures, can potentially shrink the market’s liquidity pool, causing liquidity 
shortages. Furthermore they state, that bank failures can be contagious, which may eventually 
lead to a collapse of the financial system. Gorton and Huang (2004) state in their research on 
market liquidity, efficiency, and bailout policies, that market liquidity can effectively be 
strengthened or restored through bailing out distressed banks and the government can actually 
improve welfare by doing so. Concluding, it can be said that banking crises as well as 
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liquidity injections by the government can be seen as monetary shocks similar to changes in 
the federal funds rate. 
REITs rely heavily on external financing. Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan (2008) 
found that banking crises can externally hinder real activity, especially in those sectors that 
are more dependent on external financing. This might lead to the expectation that REITs 
profit from the positive signaling effect of a bank bailout, strengthening the market’s liquidity 
pool. Furthermore, Giannetti and Simonov (2009) found that the recapitalization of a bank 
leads to positive abnormal returns for the bank’s customer companies. However the question 
remains on whether bank bailouts as a positive market signal produce the same effect on 
broader equity markets or even favor capital intensive industries like REITs. In their 
investigation of stock market responses on bank restructuring policies Klingebiel et al. (2001) 
found that bank stock prices as well as non-financial stocks respond positively to the 
announcements of government guarantees for bank liabilities. However, non-financial 
companies react negatively when public recapitalization schemes which aim to strengthen 
banks’ capital bases and support generous liquidity programs are announced. Bank stocks do 
not show a similar reaction. Klingebiel et al. (2001) conclude from these results, that 
“announcements of deposit guarantees may provide comfort to market participants during a 
crisis of confidence, but the provision of public funds for bank bailouts were not necessarily 
viewed as a credible means to restore the health of the financial sector.” 
Bank bailouts are often accompanied by a public discussion about the moral hazard 
this might provoke. There is an ongoing discussion whether banks should be bailed out in 
general and if so, what would be the optimal way, in terms of the social cost and moral hazard  
trade-offs (see Goodhart and Huang, 2005). Standard LOLR (lender of last resort, the function 
of the central bank) practice assumes that ex-ante commitment to assist troubled institutions 
provokes excessive risk taking. This moral hazard should therefore be avoided (see Cordella 
and Yeyati, 2003). Furthermore Hakenes and Schnabel (2010) find that the bailout of banks 
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leads to higher risk taking among the protected bank’s competitors, independently of market 
transparency. Nonetheless, Cordella and Yeyati (2003) also state, that the right bailout design 
might, under certain circumstances, lower the banks’ appetite for risk exante. Concluding, this 
poses the question of what effects bank bailouts might have on first and second moments of 
REIT returns and other financial stocks, compared to the general equity market. 
When investigating what influences REIT returns generally, Ghosh, Guttery, and 
Sirmans (1998) found that REIT prices do respond to real estate related news, whereas 
Giliberto (1990) on the other hand found that the correlation between non-securitized real 
estate returns and REIT returns was close to zero. Ghosh, Miles, and Sirmans (1996) state that 
REITs are strongly influenced by stock market volatility in the short-term but their long-term 
return is derived from direct real estate growth. However, a constraint is the fact that the 
interdependencies are never constant. This is supported by Clayton and MacKinnon (2001) 
who find that the link between REITs, real estate, and other asset classes constantly changes. 
Since REITs have been added to three S&P general market indices over the past 10 
years they co-move more with common equities than their real estate fundaments may justify, 
as has been discovered by Ambrose, Lee, and Peek (2007) in their analysis of spillover effects 
across asset classes. Finally, Basse, and Friedrich (2009) reexamine the relationship between 
REITs and utility stocks in the current financial crisis and conclude that the crisis led to a 
structural change in this relationship. Their findings show that investments in REITs have 
become much more risky in times of crisis than utility stocks. 
 
2.2 Contribution to the Literature and Hypotheses 
The current banking crises and the discussion about the possible outcomes, of bank failures 
versus the government bailing out distressed institutions (with the $700 billion Troubled 
Asset Relief Program) has shown that market liquidity and its implications on real market 
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behavior is of high interest to the public as well as to scholars of both, financial economics 
and real estate economics. Because federal funds rate changes (as an external monetary 
shock) have been broadly researched, we are now keen to examine the effects of banking 
crises as an internal monetary shock to the system. Research on monetary rate adjustments has 
shown that REITs show comparable risk-return behavior in size and direction to common 
equities. As previous research has also elucidated, banking crises can also be seen as a unique 
internal type of monetary shock, which might produce different results. As earlier research 
Raudszus, Olliges, and Mueller (2012) on bank failures has shown, this was the case for bank 
failure announcements and we are now eager to investigate the effects bank bailouts triggered 
for REITs and other financial stocks. We believe analyzing bank bailout events as a shock to 
monetary stability and its unique impact on REITs and other financial stocks adds well to the 
literature.  
Regarding behavioral expectations of REITs’ return movements around bank bailouts, 
in line with the research by Bredin, O’Reilly, and Stevenson (2007), it is reasonable to expect 
behavior similar to common equities, which constitutes our null hypothesis. The occurrence 
of return behavior comparable to that of common equities would seem to be reasonable as 
bank bailouts may lead to a comparable increase in market liquidity as caused by monetary 
rate decreases. This argument finds further support from the fact that both of these monetary 
shocks generally occur when the market is in the same phase of an economic cycle, in this 
case a market downturn. 
The alternative hypothesis is that REITs show different return behavior compared to 
common equities, which builds on previous research on REIT behavior in the event of bank 
failures. Here, positive abnormal returns of REITs relative to common equities were observed. 
In the case of bank bailouts, as the counterpart of bank failures, this could lead to 
corresponding results. Thus our alternative hypothesis is that REITs as hard assets may 
underperform common equities, showing negative abnormal returns.  
8 
 
 
 
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data Selection and Structure of the Analysis 
The sample of the U.S. bank bailout announcements is taken from the list of bailed out banks 
by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (2011). Consistent with previous research on bank 
failures, we first consider all U.S. bank bailout dates between January 1999 and July 2010. 
Nonetheless, bank bailouts only occurred after January 2008 leaving us with a relatively short 
observation period which might potentially bias the results. The total sample of bank bailouts 
is composed of 49 event dates reflecting a total of 700 single bank bailouts totaling about 
$204 billion of invested capital by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.  
Cross checking with bank failure dates to eliminate overlapping, we find that only 
seven bank bailout dates are left. To overcome this problem, that with only seven event dates 
it is hardly possible to obtain statistically meaningful results when analyzing REIT indices, 
we conduct our analysis at the individual REIT level for 121 REITs as well as on single 
company level for other financial stocks. In total 229 other financial institutions are analyzed. 
The S&P 500 Composite Index is used as the overall market return index. The stock return 
data is retrieved from Datastream. Respective return series are used from January 1
st
 2007 
until July 31
st
 2010.  
We apply standard event study methodology to measure short term abnormal returns 
around bank bailout dates. To obtain comparable results on a risk perspective we use a beta-
aligned event study approach. Determining daily REIT beta measures by applying a simple 
GARCH (1,1) model enables us to capture market adjusted abnormal beta shifts within short-
term windows, equivalent to the standard event study. 
The 121 REITs that are investigated in this analysis divide into REITs from eight 
different subsectors which are composed as follows: 10 Industrial, 11 Lodging, 12 Office, 22 
Retail, 14 Residential, 12 Healthcare, 10 Specialized, and 16 Diversified REITs. Furthermore, 
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the REITs can be divided into 91 Equity REITs, 14 Mortgage REITs, and the 16 Diversified 
REITs. The Diversified REITs are not accounted for in the Equity REIT sub-sample since 
they may contain both, equity and mortgage real estate investments. In the course of the 
investigation also a representative sample of 229 other financial stocks are analyzed. This 
sample is composed of 30 asset management companies, 119 banks, 19 brokers and 61 
insurances. 
In order to gain a more precise insight on REIT and other financial stock behavior we 
perform return and risk event studies on every individual sub-sample. For an event window    
[-1, +1 day] we find the following CAARs (mean values): -3.34% for Lodging REITs, -2.51% 
for Office REITs, -1.61% for Retail REITs, -3.12% for Residential REITs, -1.94% for 
Healthcare REITs and -1.30% for Industrial REITs. For Specialized REITs and Diversified 
REITs we do not find statistically significant results. So, the overall result of a negative return 
effect is supported almost throughout every sub-sample, which is in line with the observation 
of a negative return effect for Equity REITs of -2.08%. Mortgage REITs do not show any 
statistically significant return effect. 
When looking at the risk effect, the picture is not quite as clear as with the return 
effect. For the total sample we do not find any statistically significant abnormal shift in risk 
regarding the means (the medians nonetheless show a positive risk shift). For Lodging and 
Healthcare REITs we observe a negative risk shift, Office REITs, Residential REITs, 
Specialized REITs, and Diversified REITs show a positive risk shift. 
When scrutinizing for a possible “Financial Stock“ biasing effect we find that the 
negative return effect is observable in numerous event windows (total sample, as well as sub-
samples), although the picture is not as clear as it is for REITs. When looking at the risk effect 
we observe a highly significant positive risk shift throughout basically every event window in 
every sub-sample.  
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Comparing these results with our findings from previous research on bank failures, 
where we observed a positive return effect and no significant risk shift, our findings add well 
to the literature. 
Five observations might uncover as potential biases for our analyses: 
First, at each specific bank bailout date up to 49 banks (on average 27 banks) were bailed out 
by the U.S. government at the same time. This is the reason why we denote the events as 
bank bailout dates instead of bank bailouts.  
Banking crises have two possible outcomes: 1) the recapitalization by the government, 
namely the bank bailout and 2) the bank failure which commonly results in bank M&A 
because former competitive financial institutions continue the failed banks’ operations 
and accounts. Hence, we use the results of previous research on bank failures as a 
robustness check for this analysis. 
Due to the prevalent accumulation of bank bailouts in short time periods the average time gap 
between the analyzed bank bailout dates is 18.6 days. This could lead to a certain overlap 
of effects in relatively short event windows. We control for this biasing issue by 
narrowing the maximum event window size to a [-2,+2] days around the specific event 
date. 
3.2 Methodology of the Return and Risk Event Study 
In our analysis on REITs and other financial stocks we investigate both, first and second 
moments of return. Therefore our approach must be twofold. First we look at the return 
component and secondly we investigate the risk shift.  
 For the return part we apply a standard event study methodology similar to MacKinlay 
(1997). Hereby, for the regression, we use the market model approach according to the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). In order to obtain 
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case specific betas (β) as systematic risk estimators, we perform a simple Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression 30 days prior to each event over a 250 trading day estimation 
period. As a product of these betas and the actual market returns we are now able to forecast 
expected REITs returns throughout the event windows. Subtracting the expected returns from 
the actually observed returns, we obtain the Abnormal Returns (AR). For every single event 
the abnormal returns are cumulated accordingly to the varying event window size which gives 
us the Cumulated Abnormal Returns (CAR). The Cumulated Average Abnormal Returns 
(CAAR) are derived by computing the arithmetic and geometric averages of the CARs, 
accounting for the specific number of events. We estimate the CAARs for the event windows 
[0], [-1,+1], [-2,+2], [-1,0], [-2,0], [0,+1] and [0,+2]. Since the average time span between two 
events is only 18.6 days and the smallest gap only 5 trading days, longer event windows are 
not accounted for, in order to minimize biasing effects through overlap of events and effects. 
 A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is applied to verify whether the CARs are normally 
distributed (see Massey, 1951). The CAAR means are tested for difference from zero with a 
parametric Boehmer test (see Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen, 1991). For the medians this 
is done by applying the Wilcoxen signed-rank test. 
 For the risk analysis we also use an event study methodology that enables us to 
determine abnormal risk shifts and test them statistically for difference from zero. The 
mathematical approach to this is very similar to the standard event study applied for the return 
analysis. Our risk event study model consists of five steps. In the first step daily REIT and 
other financial stock betas have to be calculated. In the next step expected betas have to be 
estimated around bank bailout dates. The third step consists of subtracting the observed betas 
from the expected betas in order to obtain Abnormal Beta shifts (AB). Next the Cumulative 
Abnormal Beta shifts (CAB) and the Cumulative Average Abnormal Betas shifts (CAAB) are 
calculated. In the fifth and last step the CAABs are tested for difference from zero. 
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 Measuring time-variant betas contradicts one of the basic assumptions of the Capital 
Asset pricing model (CAPM), in which it is assumed that beta is stable over time. 
Nonetheless, many financial economists like Fabozzi and Francis (1978), Sunder (1980), Bos 
and Newbold (1984), Collins et al. (1987), Liang, McIntosh, and Webb (1995) and 
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) have argued against the assumption of beta stability and shown 
that beta is actually stochastic and thus conditional.        
 We apply the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) 
approach in order to determine time-varying volatilities and beta measures. The GARCH 
model is one of the most commonly applied methods to observe changes in risk levels. The 
technique was developed by Engle (1982) and later on refined by Bollerslev (1986). It was 
also Bollerslev who advanced the model to the Multivariate GARCH (M-GARCH) (see 
Bollerslev, 1990). Giannopoulos (1995) shows that GARCH models can not only be used to 
measure total risk but also to divide into the two components, systematic and unsystematic 
risk. Brooks et al. (1998) investigate the forecasting accuracy of three techniques regarding 
time-variant beta: a M-GARCH, a time-varying beta market model suggested by Schwert and 
Seguin (1990), and the Kalman filter for a sample of returns on Australian industry portfolios. 
Furthermore, Faff, Hillier and Hillier (2000) applied a M-GARCH approach to model time-
varying beta in their study discussing alternative beta risk modeling techniques. They define 
an additional assumption of a constant correlation coefficient between the returns of an asset 
and respective market returns. The behavior of this correlation coefficient is core to our risk 
event study determining CAABs. 
The simple GARCH (1,1) model determines a specific asset’s time-varying variance 
as a weighted sum of a long-term average variance rate, VL, the previous day squared return, 
u²t-1, and the previous day variance, σ²t-1. The weighting factors γ, ν, and τ are determined by 
applying the iterative Maximum Likelihood technique as discussed by Hull (2006). 
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Obtaining beta measures as next step we apply the M-GARCH model that observes 
the actual betas as a product of a constant correlation coefficient, ρim, between the specific 
REIT returns and the market returns (S&P 500 Composite), respectively the other financial 
stock returns and the market returns, and the time-varying REIT standard deviation, σit, 
divided by the time-varying market standard deviation, σmt.   
    
      
   
                                                                        
Finishing the empirical groundwork, we have the following data: Daily volatility 
measures for all single REITs, all single other financial stocks and the S&P 500 Composite; 
daily correlation coefficients for all single REITs with the S&P 500 Composite and all other 
financial stocks with the S&P 500 Composite, based on a one year lag structure; and daily 
beta measures for all single REITs and all single other financial stocks in relation to the S&P 
500 Composite. 
Equivalent to beta for the standard return event study we utilize the correlation 
coefficient 30 days prior to the event for our systematic risk estimates, E(βit). REIT and 
market volatility measures remain time variant as the market return does in the standard event 
study. The abnormal beta shift, AB, is then determined as the difference between expected and 
measured beta from up to two days before to up to two days after the event.        
                 
      
   
                                                      
Cumulating ABs along the differently sized event windows [0], [-1,+1], [-2,+2], [-
1,0], [-2,0], [0,+1], and [0,+2] we obtain cumulated abnormal beta shifts, CAB. The arithmetic 
mean of CABs across the number of events, n, per analysis returns the cumulated average 
abnormal beta shifts, CAAB. Again, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is used to determine if 
these CABs are normally distributed. The non-parametric Wilcoxen signed-rank test and the 
parametric t-test are applied to test the CAABs for statistical difference to zero.  
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4 Results 
4.1 Bank Bailouts’ Effect on REITs and Other Financial Stocks 
We begin our analysis by measuring the effect of bank bailouts on risk-return profiles of the 
total sample of REITs. Before that we derived expectations regarding the reaction of REITs in 
the event of bank bailouts. Expectations are also formulated before comparing the results with 
the total sample of other financial stocks, as well as before looking into the different sub-
samples. 
 Our first analysis considers the entire sample of 121 REITs and observes the effects 
bank bailouts had on the REITs’ risk-return profile. We expect bank bailouts as a monetary 
shock to have a similar effect on REITs as the shock federal fund rate adjustments would 
have. This means, that we expect REITs to react congruent to common equities and therefore 
that no significant differences in the risk-return profile can be observed, compared to the 
market which is represented by the S&P 500 Composite index. However, as Table 1 shows 
significant negative abnormal returns (between -0.25% and -1.35%) are found for six of the 
seven event windows. The risk profile however, remains unchanged when looking at the 
means. The medians show a significant risk increase, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test however 
indicates, that in this case the means should be looked at, which show no statistically 
significant difference from zero. Accordingly, the total sample analysis indicates that bank 
bailouts induce a negative return shift for REITs compared to common equities. The REITs’ 
systematic risk appears to show no difference from common equities behavior. This results in 
a negative valuation effect for U.S. REITs in the event of bank bailouts in comparison to the 
common equity markets. Thus, our alternative hypothesis is supported at an overall level. 
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Table 1: Results of Risk/Return Event Study – Total Sample REITs 
  Abnormal returns, CAAR                 
T
o
ta
l 
sa
m
p
le
 R
E
IT
s 
        [-x; +y] Mean   Median   KS-test p Wx-test p t-test
1
 p N 
0 0 0,36%   -0,12%   0,10 0,00 -0,65 0,52 1,40 0,16 847 
1 1 -1,35% *** -1,84% *** 0,09 0,00 -5,76 0,00 -4,76 0,00 847 
2 2 -1,32% *** -1,89% *** 0,09 0,00 -4,84 0,00 -4,19 0,00 847 
0 1 -0,62% ** -0,55% *** 0,09 0,00 -3,27 0,00 -2,27 0,02 847 
0 2 -0,71% *** -0,97% *** 0,09 0,00 -3,82 0,00 -2,76 0,01 847 
1 0 -0,37% *** -0,77% *** 0,10 0,00 -2,88 0,00 -2,47 0,01 847 
2 0 -0,25% * -0,77% ** 0,10 0,00 -2,22 0,03 -1,77 0,08 847 
Abnormal beta shifts, CAAB                 
        [-x; +y] Mean   Median   KS-test p Wx-test p t-test
1
 p N 
0 0 -0,01   0,02 *** 0,26 0,00 -6,57 0,00 -1,27 0,20 847 
1 1 -0,04   0,06 *** 0,26 0,00 -6,30 0,00 -1,35 0,18 847 
2 2 -0,06   0,11 *** 0,26 0,00 -6,21 0,00 -1,35 0,18 847 
0 1 -0,03   0,04 *** 0,26 0,00 -6,33 0,00 -1,41 0,16 847 
0 2 -0,04   0,06 *** 0,26 0,00 -6,25 0,00 -1,43 0,15 847 
1 0 -0,02   0,04 *** 0,26 0,00 -6,38 0,00 -1,25 0,21 847 
2 0 -0,04   0,06 *** 0,26 0,00 -6,27 0,00 -1,25 0,21 847 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. CAAR: cumulative 
average abnormal return, CAAB: cumulative average abnormal beta shift, KS test: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test - p-
value ≤ 0.05 indicates normal distribution at the 5% significance level, Wx-test: Wilcoxon signed rank test as 
non-parametric median test, 
1
t-test: Parametric mean tests: Boehmer test for CAARs; Student's t-test for CAABs. 
 
These results add well to the findings of earlier research on bank failures. Raudszus, Olliges, 
and Mueller (2012) showed generally positive valuation effects for U.S. REITs in the event of 
bank failures, while their risk behavior showed no deviation from common equities. 
REITs are generally considered to be financial stock. In order to broaden our insights 
on the behavior of REITs in the case of monetary shocks, we also investigate the behavior of 
other financial stocks in the case of bank bailouts. Again our expectation is that financial 
stocks show a highly similar behavior to common equities, which again makes us expect not 
to observe any abnormal returns or abnormal beta shifts. As Table 2 shows, against our 
expectation, we find negative abnormal return effects for four of the seven observed event 
windows (between -0.30% and -0.79%). For financial services institutions (FSIs) we observe 
an abnormal increase in risk relative to the market for all event windows. Thus while the 
return analysis of REITs and FSIs show a somewhat comparable behavior, the risk analysis 
shows a clearly diverging behavior. 
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Table 2: Results of Risk/Return Event Study – Total Sample FSIs 
  Abnormal returns, CAAR                 
T
o
ta
l 
S
am
p
le
 F
S
Is
 
       [-x; +y] Mean   Median   KS-test p Wx-test p t-test
1
 p N 
0 0 -0,47% *** -0,09% *** 0,12 0,00 -2,85 0,00 -4,35 0,00 1603 
1 1 -0,01%   -0,07%   0,10 0,00 -1,26 0,21 -1,05 0,29 1603 
2 2 -0,30% ** -0,15% ** 0,10 0,00 -1,95 0,05 -2,17 0,03 1603 
0 1 -0,72% *** -0,33% *** 0,11 0,00 -5,13 0,00 -5,29 0,00 1603 
0 2 -0,79% *** -0,52% *** 0,10 0,00 -4,99 0,00 -5,05 0,00 1603 
1 0 0,24%   0,36%   0,10 0,00 -1,62 0,11 0,18 0,86 1603 
2 0 0,02%   0,02%   0,09 0,00 -0,55 0,58 -0,60 0,55 1603 
Abnormal beta shifts, CAAB                 
       [-x; +y] Mean   Median   KS-test p Wx-test p t-test
1
 p N 
0 0 0,03 *** 0,03 *** 0,11 0,00 -15,33 0,00 11,63 0,00 1603 
1 1 0,10 *** 0,10 *** 0,11 0,00 -15,28 0,00 11,76 0,00 1603 
2 2 0,16 *** 0,16 *** 0,11 0,00 -15,30 0,00 11,93 0,00 1603 
0 1 0,06 *** 0,06 *** 0,11 0,00 -15,20 0,00 11,51 0,00 1603 
0 2 0,10 *** 0,10 *** 0,11 0,00 -15,30 0,00 11,61 0,00 1603 
1 0 0,07 *** 0,06 *** 0,11 0,00 -15,35 0,00 11,90 0,00 1603 
2 0 0,10 *** 0,09 *** 0,11 0,00 -15,29 0,00 12,04 0,00 1603 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. CAAR: cumulative 
average abnormal return, CAAB: cumulative average abnormal beta shift, KS test: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test - p-
value ≤ 0.05 indicates normal distribution at the 5% significance level, Wx-test: Wilcoxon signed rank test as 
non-parametric median test, 
1
t-test: Parametric mean tests: Boehmer test for CAARs; Student's t-test for CAABs. 
 
In order to verify whether the return results are truly a comparable reaction, we conduct a 
mean-difference test. Table 3 shows strong evidence that the bank bailouts affect the return 
behavior of REITs and other financial stocks differently. The mean return reactions of REITs 
and other financial stock differ significantly in 4 of the 7 event windows – for medians they 
differ significantly in 5 out of the 7 event windows. However, there is no clear trend 
observable on whether REITs or other financial stock are affected more negatively in their 
return behavior. 
Table 3: Results of mean difference test on CAAR (means) of REITs and FSIs 
        [-x; +y] 
CAAR 
REITs 
 
CAAR   
FSIs 
 
Diff. in 
Returns Wx-test p-value   t-test p-value   
0 0 0,36%   -0,47% *** -0,84% 2,02 0,04 ** -3,28 0,00 *** 
1 1 -1,35% *** -0,01%   1,34% -4,76 0,00 *** 3,44 0,00 *** 
2 2 -1,32% *** -0,30% ** 1,02% -3,68 0,00 *** 2,16 0,03 ** 
0 1 -0,62% ** -0,72% *** -0,10% -0,20 0,84   -0,32 0,75   
0 2 -0,71% *** -0,79% *** -0,08% -1,06 0,29   -0,22 0,83   
1 0 -0,37% *** 0,24%   0,60% -3,36 0,02 ** 1,78 0,08 * 
2 0 -0,25% * 0,02%   0,27% -1,89 0,00 *** 0,68 0,49   
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. CAAR: cumulative 
average abnormal return. Wx-test: (Wilcoxon rank sum test) non-parametric median test, t-test: (Student's t-test) 
parametric mean test. 
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4.2 Bank Bailouts’ Effect on Focused REITs 
With the analysis of various sub-samples we hope to find determinants that can add 
explanatory value to the results observed in the total sample analysis. We perform risk-return 
event studies for eight different REIT property types: Industrial, Office, Retail, Residential, 
Healthcare, Lodging, Specialized, and Diversified REITs. Furthermore, we compare the 
results of Equity REITs (consisting of Industrial, Office, Retail, Residential, Healthcare, 
Lodging, and Specialized REITs) and Mortgage REITs. 
We start by comparing Mortgage REITs to Equity REITs. Equity REITs invest directly in 
properties, whereas Mortgage REITs invest into loans backed by real estate. Since the total 
sample is mainly composed of Equity REITs and this sample shows negative return effects 
while risk levels are stable, we expect similar results for Equity REITs. Mortgage REITs, due 
to their investment into loans, and hence their proximity to the lending sector should stay 
unaffected in relation to the market or might even profit from bank bailouts. See Payne and 
Mohammadi (2004) for a previous study on REIT capital investment types and cointegration 
with equity and bond markets that shows that shocks may indeed disseminate quickly across 
REIT markets.   
For all sub-sample analyses we have chosen to display the results for the exact event day, the 
[-1,+1] and the [-2,+2] event window because they display the most significant results in a 
condensed form. Reporting all event windows would exceed the limits of this paper. 
Important to mention, we have not left out any contradictory results.  
As Table 4 shows we indeed observe negative return effects and stable risk levels for Equity 
REITs, in line with the results from the total sample. Mortgage REITs show ambiguous return 
effects, without statistical significance. The medians display a significant positive abnormal 
shift in risk. Nonetheless, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates, that the CABs are normally 
distributed and therefore the means and the respective t-values should be considered when 
18 
 
 
 
evaluating the significance of risk shifts. The means versus the medians do not show any 
significant risk shifts compared to the general equity market. 
Table 4: Results of Risk/Return Event Study - REIT-type Sub-samples (I/II) 
        [-x; +y] 
CAAR 
REITs 
 
CAAR   
FSIs 
 
Diff. in 
Returns Wx-test p-value   t-test p-value   
0 0 0,36%   -0,47% *** -0,84% 2,02 0,04 ** -3,28 0,00 *** 
1 1 -1,35% *** -0,01%   1,34% -4,76 0,00 *** 3,44 0,00 *** 
2 2 -1,32% *** -0,30% ** 1,02% -3,68 0,00 *** 2,16 0,03 ** 
0 1 -0,62% ** -0,72% *** -0,10% -0,20 0,84   -0,32 0,75   
0 2 -0,71% *** -0,79% *** -0,08% -1,06 0,29   -0,22 0,83   
1 0 -0,37% *** 0,24%   0,60% -3,36 0,02 ** 1,78 0,08 * 
2 0 -0,25% * 0,02%   0,27% -1,89 0,00 *** 0,68 0,49   
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. CAAR: cumulative 
average abnormal return. Wx-test: (Wilcoxon rank sum test) non-parametric median test, t-test: (Student's t-test) 
parametric mean test. 
 
The observations from the recent analyses leads us to the general interpretation that Equity 
REITs as hard assets generally suffer compared to common equities. This might to some 
degree be caused by the moral hazard effect bank bailouts induce, favoring an appetite for 
risk, which is visibly carried over to the investment behavior. Another factor could be that the 
market might react faster to the positive signaling effect of a bank bailout, and thus 
outperform Equity REITs in the short run. These factors influence our expectations towards 
the REIT sub-samples in the following way: We expect those sectors which in times of 
market uncertainty generally have proven to be the most stable, now suffer the most in the 
event of bank bailouts, while sub-sectors closer to the general market behavior show no 
difference to the market or might even profit. See Ro and Ziobrowski (2011) and Payne 
(2006) for relevant previous evidence on the performance of property-focused REITs.   
Industrial REITs: Investing in warehouse buildings, their steady cash flows are secured by 
long term leases in multiuser properties. Generally, their long term development relies on 
good economic times. Overall, industrial REITs should be a relatively stable REIT type, 
which in the case of bank bailouts leads us to expect a tendency toward a negative 
valuation compared to common equities  
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Lodging REITs: Investing in hotel properties that cater to business and leisure travelers. 
Travelling represents one among the first expense categories affected by budget 
restrictions during crises but certainly also rises strongly in boom times. Thus, Lodging 
REITs should earn higher returns at higher risk levels. Bank bailouts should favor 
Lodging REITs compared to other REITs, which should give them a similar, if not 
positive valuation compared to the market. See also Jackson (2009) for a performance 
study on Lodging REITs. 
Office REITs: Invest in commercial office properties obtain their income on the basis of 
medium-to-long term leases of mostly multitenant buildings. Their connection to business 
makes them strongly dependent on the economy. On the other hand their property 
location close to urban centers should devalue relatively little during recessions due to 
long leases and potential multifunctional and multi-tenant use. We see Office REITs as a 
hard asset and therefore expect them to suffer from a relatively negative valuation in the 
event of bank bailouts. 
Retail REITs: Invest in shopping centers and malls, their cash flow depend more on 
household spending.  As bank bailouts do not directly impact households, spending levels 
should not be affected significantly due to this type of event. Retail REITs are thus 
expected to have decreased performance relative to common equities. E.g., Zietz, 
Sirmans, and Friday (2003) provide a performance analysis on the more traditional REIT 
types such as Retail and Office REITs.   
Residential REITs: Investing in rental apartment housing, they should be relatively distant to 
short-term market developments and hence should represent a rather stable property type. 
With no ban bail-out connection, they should have a negative valuation compared to 
common equities. We recommend considering the study of Newell and Fischer (2009) 
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that documents the role of Residential REITs in REIT portfolios. They identify, a 
generally beneficial status of Residential REITs caused by decreasing home ownership 
and increased rentals post to the subprime mortgage and financial crisis.   
Healthcare REITs: Invest in seniors housing and medical offices, they receive income from 
social security, insurance and retirement payments that should be recession resistant. 
Healthcare REITs should be one of most stable REIT types, in principle being the most 
distant from short-term economic developments. Therefore, bank bailouts should result in 
a negative valuation compared to the market which should be able to outperform this type 
of REIT in the short run after positive market signaling events.  
Specialized REITs: Investing in smaller property segments such as public storage or timber, 
they rely on unique demand segments for their cash flows. Thus, Specialized REITs may 
operate at either low or high risk levels and experience either positive or negative 
valuation effects in relation to common equities. See also Newell and Peng (2006) for a 
performance analysis of non-traditional REIT types such as healthcare and specialty. 
Diversified REITs: Through their diversified investment style, both regarding property types 
as well as equity and mortgage investment, Diversified REITs should generally represent 
the common equity market. Therefore, we do not expect any abnormal risk or return 
shifts.  
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As Table 5 shows the expectation for significantly negative CAARs is largely supported. For 
the event date itself hardly any abnormal returns are observable but for the event windows     
[-1,+1] as well as for [-2,+2] we observe significantly negative CAARs for Office, Lodging, 
Retail, Residential and Healthcare REITs. Industrial and Diversified REITs show no 
significant CAARs. Specialized REITs show significant positive CAARs, but only on the 
event date itself. Regarding risk differentials, the picture is even more ambiguous. We 
observe significant positive risk shifts for Office, Residential, Specialized, and Diversified 
REITs. Industrial and Retail REITs show no significant risk shift, while Lodging and 
Healthcare REITs even show a significant negative risk shift. 
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Table 5: Results of Risk/Return Event Study - REIT-type Sub-samples (II/II)  
REIT Type [-x; +y] Mean   Median   KS-test p Wx-test p t-test
1
 p N 
In
d
u
st
ri
al
 CAAR 
0 0 0,47%   -0,13%   0,08 0,68 -0,17 0,87 0,37 0,71 70 
1 1 -1,30%   -2,74% * 0,10 0,40 -1,72 0,09 -0,95 0,34 70 
2 2 0,32%   -2,53%   0,13 0,17 -0,78 0,43 0,26 0,79 70 
CAAB 
0 0 0,01   0,03   0,19 0,01 -1,44 0,15 0,35 0,72 70 
1 1 0,02   0,09   0,19 0,01 -1,41 0,16 0,36 0,72 70 
2 2 0,05   0,17   0,19 0,01 -1,43 0,15 0,44 0,66 70 
O
ff
ic
e 
CAAR 
0 0 0,89%   0,24%   0,14 0,06 -0,89 0,37 1,54 0,12 84 
1 1 -2,51% *** -2,98% *** 0,09 0,45 -2,65 0,01 -2,55 0,01 84 
2 2 -2,70% *** -2,46% ** 0,08 0,57 -2,10 0,04 -2,49 0,01 84 
CAAB 
0 0 0,03 ** 0,02 *** 0,14 0,07 -2,88 0,00 2,45 0,02 84 
1 1 0,08 *** 0,05 *** 0,13 0,11 -2,66 0,01 2,51 0,01 84 
2 2 0,13 ** 0,08 *** 0,13 0,11 -2,60 0,01 2,45 0,02 84 
L
o
d
g
in
g
 CAAR 
0 0 -0,59%   -0,86%   0,13 0,13 -0,38 0,70 -0,93 0,35 77 
1 1 -3,34% *** -3,59% *** 0,07 0,87 -2,51 0,01 -2,89 0,00 77 
2 2 -2,55% ** -0,88%   0,14 0,08 -1,19 0,24 -2,10 0,04 77 
CAAB 
0 0 -0,10 * -0,01   0,26 0,00 -0,84 0,40 -1,79 0,08 77 
1 1 -0,31 * -0,02   0,26 0,00 -0,78 0,43 -1,80 0,08 77 
2 2 -0,51 * -0,04   0,26 0,00 -0,76 0,44 -1,80 0,08 77 
R
et
ai
l 
CAAR 
0 0 0,79%   -0,52%   0,12 0,02 -0,76 0,45 1,28 0,20 154 
1 1 -1,61% ** -1,52% *** 0,09 0,13 -2,45 0,01 -2,38 0,02 154 
2 2 -2,44% *** -1,74% ** 0,10 0,07 -2,41 0,02 -2,53 0,01 154 
CAAB 
0 0 0,00   0,01   0,18 0,00 -1,02 0,31 -0,34 0,73 154 
1 1 -0,02   0,03   0,18 0,00 -0,88 0,38 -0,40 0,69 154 
2 2 -0,03   0,04   0,18 0,00 -0,80 0,42 -0,42 0,67 154 
R
es
id
en
ti
al
 
CAAR 
0 0 -0,57%   -0,79%   0,11 0,19 -1,51 0,13 -1,13 0,26 98 
1 1 -3,12% *** -3,30% *** 0,09 0,35 -4,02 0,00 -3,98 0,00 98 
2 2 -4,11% *** -4,34% *** 0,09 0,42 -5,05 0,00 -5,01 0,00 98 
CAAB 
0 0 0,03 *** 0,02 *** 0,16 0,01 -3,97 0,00 3,45 0,00 98 
1 1 0,09 *** 0,06 *** 0,16 0,01 -3,93 0,00 3,59 0,00 98 
2 2 0,16 *** 0,10 *** 0,16 0,01 -3,93 0,00 3,59 0,00 98 
H
ea
lt
h
ca
re
 
CAAR 
0 0 0,71% ** 0,19%   0,07 0,84 -1,40 0,16 2,02 0,04 84 
1 1 -1,94% *** -0,88% ** 0,08 0,63 -2,21 0,03 -2,85 0,00 84 
2 2 -2,93% *** -3,21% *** 0,06 0,89 -3,04 0,00 -3,17 0,00 84 
CAAB 
0 0 -0,06 * 0,03 * 0,35 0,00 -2,39 0,02 -1,74 0,09 84 
1 1 -0,20 * 0,10 * 0,36 0,00 -2,31 0,02 -1,81 0,07 84 
2 2 -0,34 * 0,16 * 0,36 0,00 -2,25 0,02 -1,84 0,07 84 
S
p
ec
ia
li
ze
d
 
CAAR 
0 0 1,47% ** 0,78% * 0,19 0,01 -1,68 0,09 2,32 0,02 70 
1 1 -0,70%   -0,79%   0,16 0,06 -1,52 0,13 -1,09 0,28 70 
2 2 -1,16%   -2,14% ** 0,21 0,00 -2,09 0,04 -1,29 0,20 70 
CAAB 
0 0 0,02 *** 0,02 *** 0,12 0,23 -3,18 0,00 2,72 0,01 70 
1 1 0,07 *** 0,05 *** 0,13 0,16 -2,97 0,00 2,52 0,01 70 
2 2 0,11 ** 0,09 *** 0,13 0,20 -2,95 0,00 2,46 0,02 70 
D
iv
er
si
fi
ed
 
CAAR 
0 0 0,17%   -0,33%   0,09 0,26 -0,30 0,76 0,34 0,73 112 
1 1 0,92%   -0,49%   0,11 0,11 -0,09 0,93 0,39 0,69 112 
2 2 1,78%   0,99%   0,12 0,09 -0,53 0,60 0,79 0,43 112 
CAAB 
0 0 0,02 * 0,03 *** 0,17 0,00 -3,45 0,00 1,65 0,10 112 
1 1 0,07   0,08 *** 0,16 0,00 -3,36 0,00 1,63 0,11 112 
2 2 0,12 * 0,14 *** 0,15 0,01 -3,35 0,00 1,68 0,10 112 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. CAAR: cumulative 
average abnormal return, CAAB: cumulative average abnormal beta shift, KS test: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test - p-
value ≤ 0.05 indicates normal distribution at the 5% significance level, Wx-test: Wilcoxon signed rank test as 
non-parametric median test, 
1
t-test: Parametric mean tests: Boehmer test for CAARs; Student's t-test for CAABs. 
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Concluding, we find a clearly negative valuation effect (negative return and increased risk) 
for Office and Residential REITs which is in line with our expectations. For Retail, 
Specialized, and Diversified REITs we observe negative valuation effects (either negative 
return or positive risk shift). For Retail REITs this confirms our expectation. On the contrary, 
we did not expect negative valuation effects for Diversified REITs. Due to their variant 
character we did not have a clear forecast for the behavior of Specialized REITs. Against our 
expectation Industrial REITs do not show negative valuation effects, but instead do not show 
any significant difference from the market development, neither for return nor for the risk 
part. For Healthcare REITs we had negative valuation expectations and for Lodging REITs 
we presumed a rather positive behavior compared to the market. For both REIT types the 
expectations cannot be confirmed nor denied. Both REIT types show negative return behavior 
which though is also accompanied by decreased risk levels and it cannot be determined which 
effect dominates. 
4.3 Bank Bailouts’ Effect on Other Financial Stock Sub-samples 
To complete our analysis on financial stock behavior we examine other financial stock sub-
samples. 
Asset Managers: This business is closely connected to the other companies in the financial 
sector, on the other hand the stable character of their management revenues should give 
them a rather stable standing which may reduce their valuation pop during bank bailouts.  
Banks: The findings of Hakenes and Schnabel (2009) show that the bailout of banks leads to 
increased risk levels of these banks’ competitors. Klingebiel et al. (2001) state that bank 
returns do not react significantly to bailout programs. On basis of this research we expect 
negative valuation effects for banks in the event of bank bailouts, not driven by return 
effects but by increasing risk levels. 
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Brokers: The operating business of brokers is generally closely connected to the general 
economy. They should participate in the positive development triggered by the positive 
signaling effect of bank bailouts. Therefore, we do not expect any significant difference 
from the general market’s behavior. 
Insurances: Through their diversified investment style, insurance companies should follow the 
general market movement relatively closely. Nonetheless, their diversified income and 
cost structure should make them a rather stable equity class. Concluding, we expect 
insurance companies to show no significantly different behavior from the market, 
possibly with slightly negative valuation tendencies. 
As Table 6 shows we find rare evidence for negative CAARs (banks, asset manager, brokers, 
and insurance companies each have only one at an event date). However, we identify a 
negative valuation effect driven by increased risk levels which are clearly observable for all 
four business sub-samples at all event windows showing significant positive risk shifts. 
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Table 6: Results of Risk/Return Event Study - FSI-type Sub-samples 
FSI Type  [-x; +y] Mean   Median   KS-test p Wx-test p t-test
1
 p N 
B
an
k
s 
CAAR 
0 0 -0,56% *** -0,16% *** 0,10 0,00 -2,88 0,00 -3,71 0,00 833 
1 1 0,34%   0,21%   0,10 0,00 -0,46 0,64 0,56 0,58 833 
2 2 -0,10%   -0,14%   0,10 0,00 -1,31 0,19 -0,95 0,34 833 
CAAB 
0 0 0,03 *** 0,03 *** 0,13 0,00 -9,74 0,00 6,70 0,00 833 
1 1 0,08 *** 0,09 *** 0,13 0,00 -9,74 0,00 6,97 0,00 833 
2 2 0,14 *** 0,15 *** 0,12 0,00 -9,79 0,00 7,16 0,00 833 
A
ss
et
 M
n
g
rs
 
CAAR 
0 0 -1,04% ** -0,20%   0,15 0,00 -1,55 0,12 -2,36 0,02 210 
1 1 -0,97%   -0,56% ** 0,11 0,02 -1,97 0,05 -1,31 0,19 210 
2 2 -0,93%   0,29%   0,07 0,18 -0,71 0,48 -1,07 0,28 210 
CAAB 
0 0 0,04 *** 0,03 *** 0,12 0,00 -6,48 0,00 5,29 0,00 210 
1 1 0,11 *** 0,09 *** 0,12 0,00 -6,42 0,00 5,12 0,00 210 
2 2 0,19 *** 0,14 *** 0,12 0,00 -6,38 0,00 5,10 0,00 210 
B
ro
k
er
s CAAR 
0 0 -0,81% * -1,09% *** 0,18 0,00 -2,61 0,01 -1,87 0,06 133 
1 1 -0,35%   -0,09%   0,11 0,06 -1,14 0,25 -1,00 0,32 133 
2 2 -0,74%   -0,87% ** 0,13 0,03 -1,96 0,05 -1,40 0,16 133 
CAAB 
0 0 0,02 ** 0,02 *** 0,08 0,34 -2,62 0,01 2,32 0,02 133 
1 1 0,05 ** 0,05 *** 0,08 0,38 -2,57 0,01 2,23 0,03 133 
2 2 0,09 ** 0,09 *** 0,08 0,38 -2,62 0,01 2,29 0,02 133 
In
su
ra
n
ce
s CAAR 
0 0 0,08%   0,22%   0,12 0,00 -1,32 0,19 -0,31 0,76 427 
1 1 -0,13%   -0,27%   0,13 0,00 -0,99 0,32 -1,21 0,23 427 
2 2 -0,23%   -0,11%   0,13 0,00 -0,52 0,60 -1,27 0,20 427 
CAAB 
0 0 0,04 *** 0,04 *** 0,11 0,00 -9,87 0,00 8,34 0,00 427 
1 1 0,13 *** 0,13 *** 0,11 0,00 -9,85 0,00 8,30 0,00 427 
2 2 0,22 *** 0,22 *** 0,11 0,00 -9,81 0,00 8,32 0,00 427 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. CAAR: cumulative 
average abnormal return, CAAB: cumulative average abnormal beta shift, KS test: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test - p-
value ≤ 0.05 indicates normal distribution at the 5% significance level, Wx-test: Wilcoxon signed rank test as 
non-parametric median test, 
1
t-test: Parametric mean tests: Boehmer test for CAARs; Student's t-test for CAABs. 
 
4.4 Robustness Analysis on Differences between Single Bailout Dates 
Finally, we investigate whether the observed results are constant over time, or if there are 
diverging results for different bailout dates and if the dollar magnitude of bailouts has an 
influence on the behavior of REITs and other financial stock. Generally, we expect the results 
to be consistent over time. However, larger bailout volumes might have a stronger impact 
than smaller ones. 
As Table 7 shows, in the case of REITs we find a significant negative return effect for 
four of the seven event dates, including the two dates with the highest amount of bailed out 
assets. Nonetheless, we also find significantly positive CAARs for two event dates. The 
remaining seventh event date shows only little evidence of a positive return effect. 
Throughout the seven bailout dates there is hardly any evidence of a risk shift. Hence, we find 
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evidence of a negative valuation effect for REITs in the event of bank bailouts supporting our 
findings from the total sample.  
The picture is not universal though. The analysis of the other financial stocks, as seen 
in Table 5.8, shows a similar picture for return. We find significant negative valuation effects 
for three of the seven event dates, including the dates one, two, and four by dollar volume of 
the bailed out assets. But for FSIs we find significantly positive CAARs for three of the event 
dates. One event date shows no significant difference in returns from the market. Comparing 
the results of the return event studies for REITs and FSIs, we find that for the five largest 
bailouts both groups show similar results in direction and significance of the results. For the 
risk part however, we observe significantly positive risk shifts for the six largest bailout dates 
for FSIs. 
Generally speaking, our findings from the total sample analysis are validated. 
Nonetheless, we do not observe a completely universal picture concerning the return analysis 
across the different event dates. 
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Table 7: Results of Risk/Return Event Study – Date Sub-samples Total Sample REITs  
Date and USD amount of bailed out assets 
 
 
[-x; +y] Mean   Median   KS-test p Wx-test P t-test
1
 p N 
1
0
/2
8
/2
0
0
8
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
U
S
D
 1
1
5
 b
il
. 
 
CAAR 
0 0 -2,05% *** -1,05% *** 0,10 0,16 -2,64 0,01 -2,67 0,01 121 
1 1 -1,84% ** -2,14% *** 0,10 0,13 -3,09 0,00 -2,43 0,02 121 
2 2 -1,38% * -2,15% ** 0,13 0,03 -2,21 0,03 -1,78 0,08 121 
CAAB 
0 0 0,04 * 0,04 *** 0,18 0,00 -3,33 0,00 1,70 0,09 121 
1 1 0,10   0,11 *** 0,18 0,00 -2,66 0,01 1,41 0,16 121 
2 2 0,15   0,18 *** 0,18 0,00 -2,56 0,01 1,34 0,18 121 
1
1
/1
7
/2
0
0
8
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
U
S
D
 3
3
 b
il
. 
 
CAAR 
0 0 -0,91% ** -0,62% * 0,13 0,03 -1,62 0,10 -2,16 0,03 121 
1 1 -8,86% *** -7,93% *** 0,13 0,04 -7,96 0,00 -9,55 0,00 121 
2 2 -12,56% *** -9,87% *** 0,09 0,21 -8,55 0,00 -10,24 0,00 121 
CAAB 
0 0 0,00   0,02   0,20 0,00 -1,52 0,13 -0,08 0,93 121 
1 1 0,00   0,06   0,21 0,00 -1,50 0,13 -0,05 0,96 121 
2 2 0,01   0,11   0,20 0,00 -1,62 0,11 0,11 0,91 121 
1
2
/3
1
/2
0
0
8
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
U
S
D
 1
5
 b
il
. 
 
CAAR 
0 0 3,82% *** 2,48% *** 0,16 0,00 -7,58 0,00 8,07 0,00 121 
1 1 4,99% *** 3,99% *** 0,16 0,01 -7,48 0,00 8,59 0,00 121 
2 2 -3,05% *** -5,94% *** 0,14 0,01 -4,36 0,00 -3,29 0,00 121 
CAAB 
0 0 -0,05   0,02 * 0,32 0,00 -1,67 0,09 -1,59 0,12 121 
1 1 -0,15   0,06 * 0,32 0,00 -1,67 0,10 -1,59 0,12 121 
2 2 -0,26   0,09   0,32 0,00 -1,42 0,16 -1,63 0,11 121 
0
1
/0
9
/2
0
0
9
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
U
S
D
 1
4
 b
il
. 
 
CAAR 
0 0 -1,29% *** -1,85% *** 0,14 0,02 -5,12 0,00 -5,42 0,00 121 
1 1 -3,64% *** -4,93% *** 0,12 0,06 -5,93 0,00 -6,90 0,00 121 
2 2 0,08%   -1,39%   0,09 0,25 -0,80 0,42 -0,63 0,53 121 
CAAB 
0 0 -0,04 ** 0,00   0,27 0,00 -0,68 0,50 -1,98 0,05 121 
1 1 -0,11 ** 0,01   0,28 0,00 -0,71 0,48 -1,98 0,05 121 
2 2 -0,18 ** 0,01   0,28 0,00 -0,69 0,49 -1,97 0,05 121 
1
2
/1
9
/2
0
0
8
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
U
S
D
 2
.8
 b
il
. 
 
CAAR 
0 0 4,08% *** 3,35% *** 0,08 0,36 -5,74 0,00 6,14 0,00 121 
1 1 1,57% * 0,88% * 0,12 0,04 -1,89 0,06 1,75 0,08 121 
2 2 4,49% *** 3,14% *** 0,10 0,16 -4,40 0,00 4,53 0,00 121 
CAAB 
0 0 -0,01   0,06 *** 0,28 0,00 -3,75 0,00 -0,42 0,67 121 
1 1 -0,03   0,18 *** 0,29 0,00 -3,87 0,00 -0,35 0,72 121 
2 2 -0,05   0,29 *** 0,28 0,00 -3,81 0,00 -0,36 0,72 121 
1
2
/2
3
/2
0
0
8
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
U
S
D
 1
.9
 b
il
. 
 
CAAR 
0 0 0,54%   0,09%   0,11 0,12 -0,66 0,51 1,16 0,25 121 
1 1 0,19%   -0,67%   0,14 0,02 -0,98 0,33 0,34 0,73 121 
2 2 4,26% *** 2,17% *** 0,15 0,01 -4,35 0,00 3,98 0,00 121 
CAAB 
0 0 -0,01   0,06 *** 0,28 0,00 -3,88 0,00 -0,20 0,85 121 
1 1 -0,02   0,18 *** 0,28 0,00 -3,91 0,00 -0,17 0,87 121 
2 2 -0,02   0,30 *** 0,28 0,00 -3,95 0,00 -0,16 0,87 121 
0
3
/1
3
/2
0
0
9
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
U
S
D
 1
.4
5
 b
il
. 
 
CAAR 
0 0 -1,65% *** -2,43% *** 0,14 0,01 -4,77 0,00 -3,11 0,00 121 
1 1 -1,84% ** -5,07% *** 0,15 0,01 -3,34 0,00 -1,94 0,05 121 
2 2 -1,09%   -3,80% *** 0,15 0,01 -2,58 0,01 -1,12 0,26 121 
CAAB 
0 0 -0,02   0,01 *** 0,33 0,00 -2,48 0,01 -1,02 0,31 121 
1 1 -0,05   0,03 ** 0,33 0,00 -2,29 0,02 -1,04 0,30 121 
2 2 -0,08   0,04 ** 0,33 0,00 -2,27 0,02 -1,05 0,30 121 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. CAAR: cumulative 
average abnormal return, CAAB: cumulative average abnormal beta shift, KS test: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test - p-
value ≤ 0.05 indicates normal distribution at the 5% significance level, Wx-test: Wilcoxon signed rank test as 
non-parametric median test, 
1
t-test: Parametric mean tests: Boehmer test for CAARs; Student's t-test for CAABs. 
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Table 8: Results of Risk/Return Event Study – Date Sub-samples Total Sample FSIs 
Date and USD amount of bailed out assets 
 
[-x ; +y] Mean   Median   KS-test p Wx-test P t-test
1
 p N 
1
0
/2
8
/2
0
0
8
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
U
S
D
 1
1
5
 b
il
. 
 
CAAR 
0 0 -4,29% *** -2,87% *** 0,07 0,16 -7,51 0,00 -8,88 0,00 229 
1 1 -3,15% *** -2,54% *** 0,06 0,44 -5,48 0,00 -6,29 0,00 229 
2 2 -2,48% *** -1,17% *** 0,08 0,08 -3,58 0,00 -4,06 0,00 229 
CAAB 
0 0 0,06 *** 0,03 *** 0,11 0,01 -4,54 0,00 5,09 0,00 229 
1 1 0,15 *** 0,09 *** 0,11 0,01 -4,22 0,00 4,87 0,00 229 
2 2 0,24 *** 0,13 *** 0,11 0,01 -4,12 0,00 4,78 0,00 229 
1
1
/1
7
/2
0
0
8
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
U
S
D
 3
3
 b
il
. 
 
CAAR 
0 0 -0,15%   0,45%   0,11 0,01 -0,86 0,39 -0,37 0,71 229 
1 1 -2,21% *** -1,39% *** 0,08 0,11 -4,51 0,00 -4,88 0,00 229 
2 2 -4,52% *** -2,31% *** 0,11 0,01 -5,87 0,00 -6,51 0,00 229 
CAAB 
0 0 0,03 *** 0,01 *** 0,10 0,02 -2,99 0,00 3,39 0,00 229 
1 1 0,08 *** 0,04 *** 0,10 0,02 -2,87 0,00 3,23 0,00 229 
2 2 0,14 *** 0,08 *** 0,10 0,03 -3,06 0,00 3,34 0,00 229 
1
2
/3
1
/2
0
0
8
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
U
S
D
 1
5
 b
il
. 
 
CAAR 
0 0 1,92% *** 1,30% *** 0,16 0,00 -6,29 0,00 5,61 0,00 229 
1 1 2,80% *** 1,84% *** 0,14 0,00 -6,58 0,00 6,53 0,00 229 
2 2 -0,08%   -1,46%   0,10 0,01 -1,50 0,13 -0,61 0,54 229 
CAAB 
0 0 0,03 *** 0,04 *** 0,18 0,00 -6,33 0,00 3,71 0,00 229 
1 1 0,08 *** 0,13 *** 0,18 0,00 -6,33 0,00 3,68 0,00 229 
2 2 0,13 *** 0,21 *** 0,17 0,00 -6,33 0,00 3,78 0,00 229 
0
1
/0
9
/2
0
0
9
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
U
S
D
 1
4
 b
il
. 
 
CAAR 
0 0 -1,40% *** -1,14% *** 0,09 0,06 -6,48 0,00 -6,81 0,00 229 
1 1 -2,43% *** -2,28% *** 0,06 0,34 -6,33 0,00 -7,00 0,00 229 
2 2 -1,96% *** -1,38% *** 0,07 0,17 -4,02 0,00 -4,35 0,00 229 
CAAB 
0 0 0,02 *** 0,03 *** 0,17 0,00 -6,39 0,00 3,27 0,00 229 
1 1 0,06 *** 0,08 *** 0,16 0,00 -6,60 0,00 3,63 0,00 229 
2 2 0,09 *** 0,13 *** 0,17 0,00 -6,63 0,00 3,68 0,00 229 
1
2
/1
9
/2
0
0
8
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
U
S
D
 2
.8
 b
il
. 
 
CAAR 
0 0 0,22%   0,01%   0,14 0,00 -0,59 0,55 0,50 0,62 229 
1 1 1,32% *** 1,43% *** 0,11 0,01 -3,69 0,00 3,20 0,00 229 
2 2 1,66% *** 1,28% *** 0,10 0,02 -3,46 0,00 3,27 0,00 229 
CAAB 
0 0 0,05 *** 0,06 *** 0,08 0,07 -8,77 0,00 9,18 0,00 229 
1 1 0,15 *** 0,17 *** 0,09 0,05 -8,72 0,00 9,03 0,00 229 
2 2 0,26 *** 0,30 *** 0,09 0,04 -8,71 0,00 9,01 0,00 229 
1
2
/2
3
/2
0
0
8
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
U
S
D
 1
.9
 b
il
. 
 
CAAR 
0 0 -0,04%   0,14%   0,14 0,00 -0,01 0,99 -0,03 0,98 229 
1 1 0,21%   -0,20%   0,11 0,01 -0,08 0,93 0,74 0,46 229 
2 2 0,37%   0,46%   0,11 0,01 -1,06 0,29 0,98 0,33 229 
CAAB 
0 0 0,05 *** 0,06 *** 0,11 0,01 -8,47 0,00 8,40 0,00 229 
1 1 0,16 *** 0,19 *** 0,11 0,01 -8,52 0,00 8,42 0,00 229 
2 2 0,26 *** 0,31 *** 0,11 0,01 -8,57 0,00 8,63 0,00 229 
0
3
/1
3
/2
0
0
9
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
U
S
D
 1
.4
5
 b
il
. 
 
CAAR 
0 0 0,43%   -0,03%   0,11 0,01 -0,08 0,94 1,14 0,25 229 
1 1 3,37% *** 1,45% *** 0,16 0,00 -3,67 0,00 4,32 0,00 229 
2 2 4,91% *** 2,90% *** 0,14 0,00 -5,56 0,00 5,82 0,00 229 
CAAB 
0 0 0,00   0,01 *** 0,23 0,00 -3,64 0,00 0,16 0,87 229 
1 1 0,01   0,04 *** 0,22 0,00 -3,79 0,00 0,34 0,74 229 
2 2 0,01   0,07 *** 0,21 0,00 -3,69 0,00 0,34 0,73 229 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. CAAR: cumulative 
average abnormal return, CAAB: cumulative average abnormal beta shift, KS test: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test - p-
value ≤ 0.05 indicates normal distribution at the 5% significance level, Wx-test: Wilcoxon signed rank test as 
non-parametric median test, 
1
t-test: Parametric mean tests: Boehmer test for CAARs; Student's t-test for CAABs. 
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4.5 Multivariate Regressions of FSI CARs on the All-REIT sample 
 
Our final analysis consists of two sets of multivariate regressions. The dependent variables are 
the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and cumulative abnormal beta shifts (CABs) of the 
All-REIT sample in the [-1,+1] event window. As independent variables we use the respective 
CARs and CABs of the All-FSI sample (without REITs) and the FSI sub-samples, banks, 
insurance companies, brokers and asset managers. Because REITs are generally seen as 
financial stocks along with the 4 previously mentioned sub-samples, our objective is to 
determine how far the CARs and CABs of the All-REIT sample are driven by the other FSIs. 
Since we view REITs to be an Asset Class of their own and not just another subclass of the 
Financial Services Industry we expect the REITs CARs and CABs to be independent and not 
be driven by the FSIs CARs and CABs. Our previous analysis has shown significant 
differences in the behavior of REITs compared to FSIs. 
Looking at the results of the multivariate regression displayed in Table 9, our 
expectations are confirmed to a great extent. We find that of the sub-samples, only the asset 
managers appear to be a driver of the CARs. The All-REIT sample has a low significance 
level, and the same is true for the All-FSI sample. No other interdependencies are found. 
Furthermore, when looking at the adjusted R² scores, it is obvious, that the CARs and CABs 
of the All-REIT sample are not driven by those of the All-FSI sample nor by those of the FSI 
sub-samples, as the explanatory power of the model is close to zero. 
These findings are in line with our earlier results and show that REITs clearly differ 
from FSIs with regard to their behavior during bank bailout events. 
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Table 9: Multivariate Regressions: Drivers of All-REIT sample’s CARs and CABs 
Dependent 
variable:  CARs [0] of All-REIT sample     CABs [0] of All-REIT sample   
Model     1 2 3 4 5     1 2 3 4 5 
    α -0,014 -0,009 -0,013 -0,013 -0,009   α -0,084 -0,080 -0,091 -0,091 -0,084 
      -3,733 -1,165 -3,626 -3,473 0,482     -1,954 -3,462 -3,478 -3,219 -4,264 
Independent 
variables: CARs [0] of FSI samples       CABs [0] of FSI samples   
All FSIs   δ1 -0,287 *         γ1 -0,018         
    -1,990             -0,049         
Banks   δ2   -1,333         γ2   -0,888       
      -0,673             -0,589       
Insurances   δ3     0,143       γ3     0,413     
        0,544             0,289     
Broker   δ4       0,118     γ4       0,414   
          0,679             0,250   
Asset 
Managers 
  δ5         -1,952 * γ5         0,263 
  
          1,901             0,454 
Nobs.   847           847         
R² (adj.)     0,003 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 0,003     -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 
F-stat. (p.-val.)   0,153 0,781 0,871 0,799 0,178     0,806 0,708 0,762 0,792 0,724 
DW-stat.     1,669 1,676 1,671 1,673 1,668     1,291 1,292 1,290 1,291 1,291 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; t-statistics in italic.  
 
5 Conclusion 
This research examines whether REITs, and financial stocks, react differently from the 
common equity market when a positive monetary shock to the market occurs through the 
injection of liquidity by the government in form of bank bailouts. The objective is to advance 
previous research on the behavior of REITs in the case of monetary shocks. Previous research 
has shown that REITs react similarly to common equities in the event of some monetary 
shocks such as a change in federal fund rates. We believe though, that the type of monetary 
shock is of crucial importance on how it affects REIT behavior and previous evidence on 
bank failure events. Bank failures were shown to cause positive valuation effects on REITS 
compared to other common equities. Although bank failures and federal fund rate increases 
both trigger a limitation in market liquidity, they provoke opposite valuation effects on 
REITs. This might, to some degree, be attributable to the fact that they generally occur in 
completely different market situations. Since bank bailouts as well as federal fund rate 
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decreases generally occur in similar market phases, usually in a recession, our null hypothesis 
states that REITs risk-return profile should not behave significantly different from other 
equities in the case of bank bailouts. 
However, our empirical results for the total sample show that REITs generally 
experience significant negative abnormal returns (between -0.25% and -1.35%) around bank 
bailout dates, while we do not observe a shift in systematic risk levels. These results 
compliment the previous research on bank failures which showed positive return effects 
around bank failures, while risk levels remained stable.  
Comparing the results on REITs with the total sample of other FSIs, we find 
comparable results with regard to the return analysis, however, in contrast to REITs, FSIs 
show a significant increase in risk levels. Generally speaking, REITs, as well as the other 
financial stocks, show a negative valuation effect around bank bailouts. This might bias our 
findings, as we might not be observing a unique behavior of REITs, but of the entire financial 
stock sector. 
The analysis of the REIT sub-samples provides us with valuable insights on how 
diverse the different REIT property types react to the monetary shock of bank bailouts. 
Generally, the findings on the property type sub-samples support the previous research on 
bank failures, as almost all REIT classes show reverse valuation effects during bank bailouts 
versus bank failures. The analysis of other FSIs shows, that the negative return effect is only 
clearly observable for two of the four sub-samples, while a positive risk shift is clearly 
displayed on a highly significant level throughout all sub-samples. 
Concluding, we find that the effect monetary shocks have on REITs, compared to the 
general stock market, and FSIs depends highly on the type of monetary shock. Bank bailouts 
and bank failures have reverse valuation effects on REITs.’ In our opinion  this research 
supports the safe heaven theory of Mueller and Mueller (2003) indentifying Equity REITs as 
hard asset in times of market uncertainty, to the degree, that these REITs are outperformed by 
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the market during the positive market signaling effects of bank bailouts. Furthermore, we find 
increasing risk levels for financial services institutions which might be a sign for the moral 
hazard problem involved with bank bailouts. 
As our research has shown unique results for REITs from other financial stocks, 
scholars should further investigate the performance of REITs as a separate asset class versus 
financial stocks and other industries that also belong to this group, in order to verify what 
characteristics are generally attributable to financial stocks and which ones are REIT-specific. 
The multivariate regression supports the initial analyses as it shows that REIT CARs and 
CABs are not driven by those of FSIs, and therefore, that REITs and FSIs clearly differ in 
their behavior with respect to bank bailouts. 
The major limitations to our study are the following: First, we only research U.S. 
REITs and financial stock market data, which might not apply to other markets. Second, 
although we took into consideration the time period from January 1999 until July 2010, our 
research is limited to a rather short period of time, as bank bailouts only occurred between 
January 2008 and July 2010. Third after eliminating bail-out dates that overlap with bank 
failures only seven event dates remain. We try to compensate for this by conducting the 
analysis at the individual REIT level in order to investigate a sufficient number of data points. 
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